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Abstract: Our global food system is characterized by an increasing concentration and imbalance
of power, with trade-offs between hunger, inequality, unsustainable production and consumption,
and proﬁt. A systematic analysis of power imbalances in food systems is required if we are to meet
the 2030 Agenda vision of promoting sustainable production and consumption patterns and ending
hunger and poverty. Such an analysis, with a view to a transformation to more sustainable and
just food systems, requires tools to be developed and tested in real-life case studies of food systems.
To better understand the structures and mechanisms around power in food systems, this study applies
a political ecology lens. We adapted the “power cube” analysis framework that was proposed by the
Institute of Development Studies for the analysis of spaces, forms, and levels of power. We apply the
analysis of these three dimensions of power to two food systems in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia:
one agroindustrial and one indigenous. After identifying food system actors, the food system spaces
in which they interact, and what forms of power they use at what levels, we discuss some implications
for an emerging scientiﬁc culture of power analyses in critical sustainability assessments. Mechanisms
of hidden power undermine visible legislative power in both case studies, but in our example of an
indigenous food system of the Guaraní people, visible power stays with a local community through
their legally recognized and communally owned and governed territory, with important implications
for the realization of the right to food.
Keywords: spaces of power; power cube analysis; political ecology; agroindustrial food system;
indigenous food system; Guaraní people; Bolivia
1. Introduction
The right to food has been deﬁned as “the right of every individual, alone or in community
with others, to have physical and economic access at all times to sufﬁcient, adequate and culturally
acceptable food that is produced and consumed sustainably, preserving access to food for future
generations” [1]. Through this deﬁnition, the former United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the
Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, added a sustainability dimension to the existing UN deﬁnition
of the right to food. However, food systems are often characterized by the unequal distribution of
food and the resources to produce or access it. Scholars have described today’s food systems as facing
multiple crises [2–4], with food systems falling short in terms of human rights and sustainability.
Food security frameworks have tended to frame hunger as a technological problem and point to a
need to increase production [5,6]. However, food system activities and access to resources are to a large
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extent shaped by power relations, while different forms of power are a central part of social relations
between different actors, e.g., as described by Barnett and Duvall [7]. In terms of actors, globalized
food systems are often hour-glass shaped: one side comprises the producers, the other the consumers,
and in between are the few actors who control how food is moved from producers to consumers [4,8].
The International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES-Food) [9] describes how more
horizontal and vertical restructuring is an ongoing trend in globalized food systems, towards more
concentration of power in input provision, storage, and distribution.
Given the importance of power relations in food systems, studying these should not be
neglected [10]. Local assessments of households and of community-level processes have tended
not to focus on the broader role of power in the political and economic context [11]. Barnett and
Duvall [7] note that there has been much analysis on governance, including resource governance [12],
but very little on power relations in food systems. In particular, the discursive power and agency of
social groups in agri-food value chains has been widely overlooked [13].
Scholars have argued that a political ecology lens is needed for the analysis of sustainability
and human rights related to food systems, i.e., the fair and sustainable production, distribution,
and consumption of food [6,14]. Political ecology investigates political dynamics, including unequal
power relations, that inﬂuence environmental change from local to global scales [15,16]. In relation to
food and agriculture, political ecology reinserts the topics of power, exploitation, politics, and especially
environmental degradation, which have long been ignored in research and politics on agriculture and
food ([17], cited in [18]). Used as an actor-oriented approach, political ecology allows for a focus on
marginalized groups, who may be negatively affected by the decisions of other, more powerful actors,
with the aim of making them visible [16].
According to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency [19], social and
political thinkers have long debated what power is, making it an “essentially contested concept” with
no uniﬁed theory. Clapp and Fuchs [20] have speciﬁcally discussed the political role that corporations
play in global food system governance, and IPES-Food [9] analyzed an increasing concentration of
power in the global food system. Different entry points to the analysis of power structures have been
developed, from Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches and the critical theory of Habermas, to the
work of Bourdieu and Foucault [21]. For Bourdieu, class conﬂicts and material interest were root
causes of social inequality [21], and power structures could be observed in discourses, an approach
that was also deepened by Foucault. Navarro [21] described Bourdieu’s understanding of power
as a relational process that “sustains the fabric of society,” concluding that power is not an isolated
variable or inﬂuencing factor but connected to existing structures. According to Navarro, Bourdieu’s
sociological theory is a promising one by which to analyze power relations because it permits us to
understand legalized forms of domination that are inﬂuenced and reproduced by both structure and
agency (see also Reference [16]). This is important for food system research, because a focus only
on structural power can lead to a deterministic view that leaves little space for agency and therefore
innovation [16]. Habermas argued that a shift from strategic to communicative action would render
power relations less signiﬁcant in terms of decision-making; Rist et al. [22,23] applied Habermas’
theory of communicative action to the ﬁeld of natural resource governance, and concluded that the
sustainable governance of natural resources in communities needs new spaces where communicative
action is possible and where a common understanding of situations, aims, and ways to achieve them
can be formed and validated.
One entry point that has gained importance in development research and practice is Gaventa’s [24]
power analysis framework “power cube,” which features three power dimensions: spaces of power,
forms of power, and places (levels) of power. For “forms of power,” Gaventa [24] distinguishes between
visible, invisible, and hidden power (see Section 4.1). This concept was made applicable for research
and development projects by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), with the aim of making
norms, beliefs, and practices tangible and visible, as well as identifying strategies and responses [24].
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To our knowledge, there is to date no tool to analyze power relations in food systems
that addresses actors, their interaction, and their rights. Power in the governance of natural
resources has been widely analyzed using the theories of Habermas (e.g., References [22,23,25,26]),
Bourdieu (e.g., References [21,27–29]), and Foucault [30]. However, these approaches seem to be
difﬁcult to apply to the complex structures of food systems. Picking up on Nelson’s [13] study on
power relations in Kenyan agri-food value chains, we therefore explore the use of the “power cube” tool
proposed by Gaventa [31] for the study of different food systems in Bolivia. For this purpose, we ask
the question of what spaces and forms of power exist, and how they play out among different groups
of actors in different places of selected food systems. We aim at contributing to critical sustainability
research with a qualitative assessment of different types of power and related mechanisms in two
different food systems in the lowlands of Bolivia.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1. What Does Power Mean in Food Systems and How Can It be Framed for Research
Power analysis comes from critical social theory, anthropology, political sociology, and feminist
theory. It is used to better understand socialized and internalized norms and behavior, and to explore
the links between agency and structure. The “Action Research” tradition (e.g., Reference [22,32,33])
bases the search for solutions to “real-world problems” on the integration of scientiﬁc and other forms
of knowledge. Regarding the analysis of power, “critical or emancipatory” action research aims at
connecting the personal and political levels in order to “overcome felt dissatisfactions, alienation,
ideological distortion, and the injustices of oppression and domination” [22] (p. 220). In the same
context, Dürr [34] speaks of holistic thinking that is necessary for the analysis of power as implicit in
everything, not limited to the background, but present in interactions, interrelations, co-dependences,
and bridges, all of which are possible in spaces of multi-actor agreement.
Following Gaventa [24] (p. 26), “spaces” can be regarded as “opportunities, moments and channels
where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their
lives and interests ( . . . ) these spaces for participation are not neutral, but are themselves shaped by power
relations, which both surround and enter them”. The concepts of power and space are, thus, closely linked.
In sustainability and development research, this affects the mechanisms of participation: Empowered
participation means not only to participate, but also to have the right to deﬁne and shape the space
and thus the decisions that are made [24]. Participation alone is not a guarantee to be heard, and the
loudest voices are easily favored. One should therefore differentiate between the quality of interaction
spaces, and ﬁnd out how such arenas are formed and by whom (see Reference [13]). We start in the
next subchapter by conceptualizing spaces of power as food system arenas: speciﬁcally, where do
food system activities take place and where are forms of power exerted among different actors
(see Reference [24]).
2.2. Food Systems and Food Value Chains
Food systems can be deﬁned as “interdependent networks of stakeholders (companies, ﬁnancial
institutions, public and private organizations, and individuals) in a geographical area (region, state,
or multinational region), that participate directly or indirectly in the creation of ﬂows of goods
and services geared towards satisfying the food needs” [35] (p. 19). For the purpose of assessing
power relations, it is important to investigate differences in power, which can be done by comparing
different actors and their activities. In food systems, this means looking at food value chains (seen as
activities and their links [36]) from production to processing and storage, retail and trade, consumption,
and beyond. We conceptualize these food system stages as possible “spaces of power”—where food
system activities take place, decisions are taken, and actors meet (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Food system stages as spaces of power, based on Rist and Jacobi [37], and Rastoin and
Ghersi [35].
For our understanding of “food system,” we consider more than food ﬂows or agri-food
value chains because we focus on actors and because material and immaterial context features are
fundamental parts of food systems. Among these are (i) the natural resource base of a food system;
(ii) the ﬂows of information and services (e.g., ﬁnancial); and (ii) the political context of a food
system (including, e.g., international trade agreements) (see Reference [35]). While it is possible to
conceptualize one global food system (e.g., Reference [8]), there are a wide range of (strongly differing)
forms of production, processing, distribution, and consumption in place in a given area, with different
outcomes in terms of the right to food or sustainability. For comparative purposes, it therefore makes
sense to distinguish between different types of food systems according to their modes of production,
distribution, and consumption not only spatially (e.g., local, national, regional, and global), but also
qualitatively, e.g., based on their degree of reliance on external inputs. Colonna et al. [38] differentiate
between (1) agroindustrial food systems, (2) domestic food systems, (3) regional food systems, (4) local
food systems, and (5) differentiated-quality food systems [38].
3. Case Studies and Study Area
This analysis was part of a research project on “food sustainability” in Bolivia and Kenya [39],
which also investigated the right to food as one of ﬁve pillars of food sustainability (besides food
security, environmental performance, poverty and inequality, and social-ecological resilience). We base
this analysis on results from our study area in Bolivia, where the right to food has been enshrined in the
2009 Constitution, following a long history of struggle by peasants and indigenous communities for
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their rights to their ancestral territories. Using the typology by Colonna et al. [38], we observed different,
coexisting food systems in Santa Cruz Department (Bolivia is subdivided into nine Departments:
Santa Cruz (where this study took place), Chuquisaca, Tarija, Potosi, Oruro, Cochabamba, La Paz,
Beni, and Pando), in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia. Our case studies comprise one predominant
agroindustrial food system and a much smaller, but culturally and historically important, indigenous
food system of the Guaraní people. The Department produces a large part of the country’s food supply
(wheat, rice, corn, beef, and others), and therefore plays an important role in terms of national food
security. Santa Cruz accounted for more than half (54%) of the country’s total agrarian exports [40] in
2016, and politicians have coined the Department the economic engine of Bolivia.
The production stage of the agroindustrial food system in Santa Cruz Department covers about
1 million ha of land, mainly cultivated with soybeans (58.8% in 2013 [41]). Wheat, rice, maize, sesame,
and sugar cane are also produced, albeit to a lesser extent, with the products circulating along national
to global food value chains. Since we were unable to investigate all value chains belonging to this food
system, the project team decided to focus on the most important value chain in terms of resource use,
investment, and political attention. This value chain is based on soybean production (see Figure 2),
and it provides edible oil to the national market as well as feed for dairy and meat production in the
study region, at the national level, and abroad. While 78% of the soybean farmers share only 9% of the
land, a mere 2% of large-scale soybean producers use 71% of the cultivated area [42]. Urioste [43,44]
describes how enterprises, mainly from Brazil, acquired large landholdings in Bolivia for soybean
production (Grupo Monica, UNISOYA, and the GAMA group alone cultivate at least 200,000 ha) and
links this “concentration and foreignization” of the largest and most productive lands in Santa Cruz
Department to the increased demand for soybeans overseas. The expansion of soybean production is
linked to unprecedented deforestation in Santa Cruz Department [45–47]. Annual deforestation rates
rank among the highest in the world, at 463,000 ha in 2017 [48]. Bolivia’s ﬁve-fold increase of pesticide
imports from 2004 to 2016 is correlated with the legislation of genetically modiﬁed, herbicide-resistant
soybeans in 2005. Among the registered active ingredients, 72% are on Pesticide Action Network’s list
of “highly hazardous pesticides” [49].
Figure 2. Left side: Soybean ﬁeld near Pailón. Right side: Sugar cane transport in San Pedro,
both Santa Cruz Department, Bolivia 2016.
It is important to note that the agroindustrial sector of Santa Cruz is not operating in an empty
space. Bolivia has 36 ofﬁcial indigenous peoples, of which the Aymara, Quechua, and Guaraní-speaking
groups are the largest. Large areas of Santa Cruz Department are part of the Gran Chaco region,
a semi-arid ecosystem that stretches over Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argentina. The Guaraní people
have inhabited the Bolivian Chaco region since pre-colonial times and have a strongly developed
food identity around maize. Most typical food is related to maize (see Figure 3): Achi (maize ﬂour),
pito (toasted maize, also avatikui), frangollo (soup with ground maize and meat), atiruru (boiled maize),
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and guïtimimo (cake). Somó and kägui (chicha) are culturally important beverages made of maize [50].
We selected this food system as a case study located in the Municipality of Cabezas, about 120 km south
of the city of Santa Cruz. Part of this municipality is the ofﬁcial indigenous territory of 11 Guaraní
communities called “the Captaincy of Takovo Mora”. Following Colonna et al. [38], the food system of
the Guaraní communities may be classiﬁed as a “domestic food system”: It consists of both subsistence-
and market-oriented food production, processing, and consumption in and around small Guaraní
settlements. Besides maize, this food system comprises cassava, peanuts, peppers, beans, fruits,
vegetables, chicken, pigs, and wild meat (e.g., armadillo). A large share of this food is processed,
stored, and consumed within the producing households, and the surplus is traded or exchanged in
local to regional markets. Commercialization of products (e.g., maize or animals) can be tracked to the
city of Santa Cruz. A high diversity is not only present in terms of types of crops and food products,
but also in family structures and social organization (see Section 5.2).
Figure 3. Guaraní women in the village of Yateirenda preparing achi (maize ﬂour), 2017 (image credits:
Carlos Silvestre).
4. Methods
4.1. The “Power Cube” Framework
As an analytical tool, we applied the “power cube tool” from the Institute of Development
Studies [31] to the analysis of power relations in food systems. The “power cube” is a three-dimensional
tool for analyzing the different dimensions of power and the way power works in processes of
governance, in organizations, and in social relationships. The model for this tool is the Rubik’s
cube, a three-dimensional toy with many conﬁguration possibilities. Gaventa [24] calls the three
dimensions of the cube “spaces,” “places,” and “forms of power”: Each of them has at least three
dimensions, which are conceptually linked (Figure 4). By allocating observed actors and activities
in these dimensions, the framework can be helpful for identifying the possibilities of transformative
action in various settings [31].
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Figure 4. The power cube framework [51].
Power cube analysis allows us to go further than actors’ perceptions, which we assessed previously
in the same food system case studies [52], and perceptions on what constitutes “good food” [53].
Using the power cube, we can analyze three dimensions of power in a speciﬁc setting, investigating
horizontal relationships in relation to vertical governance levels. Gaventa [24] differentiates between
three different types of power spaces: closed spaces, where elites or empowered groups or individuals
make decisions with little consultation or involvement of other actors; invited spaces, where authorities
create opportunities for involvement and consultation, often legally constituted, e.g., “participatory
governance”; and claimed or created spaces of participation in which subaltern, apparently powerless or
excluded groups create collective action by themselves, e.g., through social movements or community
associations, often outside formalized policy arenas.
In addition to the spaces, a distinction is made between three forms of power in the cube: visible,
hidden, and invisible. Visible power refers to observable decision-making, often according to formal
rules and structures, e.g., related to governmental or juridical authorities, with their related legal
procedures. However, observable decision-making processes are not always democratic and often take
place in closed spaces. Therefore, democratization and accountability of visible power are some of the
main topics in power analysis [24]. We address this form of power in terms of norms and rules as well
as a compilation of groups of actors who visibly make decisions. In contrast, hidden power represents
those mechanisms in (mostly informal) decision-making that set or inﬂuence the political agenda
behind the scenes. Actors of hidden power are people and institutions that are inﬂuential in terms of
who decides and what is being discussed and decided in arenas of visible power. A typical example is
discourse shaping, i.e., framing storylines by interpreting phenomena, often broadened or simpliﬁed,
that target or attract different actors for different reasons [54]. A third form of power on the power
cube is invisible power, which refers to peoples’ attitudes and consciousness, i.e., what people think and
how this inﬂuences their psychological and ideological boundaries of participation in decision-making.
This form of power is extremely important, as people’s ideals and beliefs determine whether or not
they accept a certain political decision or their situation. Ideals and beliefs also determine what is
regarded as normal, acceptable, and desirable or whether people would consider developing collective
action to change a subaltern situation.
The spaces and forms of power can be located on at least three different levels, in power
cube terminology known as local, national, and global places, which imply a notion of boundaries
and the level at which participation takes place (or not) [24], and whether power processes are
top-down or bottom-up (Ibid.). Globalization and decentralization processes can also be located in this
power dimension.
The next section describes how we applied the power cube analysis to our two case studies.
Nelson et al. [13] applied power cube analysis to ﬂower value chains in Kenya, speciﬁcally analyzing
labor rights. However, we are not aware of any power cube analyses in food systems. Therefore,
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our approach may be regarded as explorative, and is meant as an initiation of further power analyses
in food systems.
4.2. Analytical Steps for Applying Power Cube Analysis to Food Systems
For the analysis of power relations in food systems, we ﬁrst elaborated a characterization of key
actors at every stage of the food system (Step 1). Key actors in food systems are those actors whose
livelihoods (not only income, but also access to food or the means of its production) depend directly on
their involvement in respective food value chains, or whose decisions have far-reaching impacts on
a food system. We conducted this step in the framework of a previous study in the larger research
project [39] (see also Section 4.3.1).
Step 2 was the identiﬁcation and characterization of spaces in which food system actors
interact. We conceptualized four main food system stages (production, in which we include
input provision, processing, distribution, and consumption) as spaces of power (see Section 2.2
on food systems). These spaces can be closed, invited, created, or claimed, or a mix of these,
depending on their components and actors. Food system stages of production, processing, distribution,
and consumption provide arenas for the exchange (and associated power exertion) of different
groups of actors. Interaction can be direct (e.g., producer–consumer on a farmers’ market) or indirect
(e.g., seller–purchaser on the stock market). For example, soybean producers in Santa Cruz Department
usually do not meet the consumers of their produce (e.g., when soybean from South America is used
for feed in meat production in Europe and China). However, the actors who organize agricultural
extension are often the same transnational companies (TNCs) that provide agricultural inputs (seeds
and agrochemicals). We characterize the spaces according to how decisions are made and whether
these spaces permit interaction and participation. The quality of interaction of food system actors is
strongly inﬂuenced by the types of spaces, their distances, connections, or overlaps.
Step 3 implied ﬁnding out in what spaces or actor relationships what forms of power play out,
and how. This step is linked to a deﬁnition and analysis of the places of power in which the spaces are
located and in and between which actors interact. For this, we located actors and forms of power
in places of power (local, national, global, or transversal), and identiﬁed how they are linked in the
sense of a political ecology approach, e.g., how a decision in another place inﬂuences the natural
resource base of a local food system [6]. While our work focuses primarily on the local level in two
Municipalities in Santa Cruz Department, we identify and characterize spaces and forms of power that
are organized at the national up to the global level and show how this vertical integration inﬂuences
the food systems at the local level. After this assessment, possibilities for collective action for more
transparency and democratization may be explored as a further step [24].
Step 4 of the analysis is therefore the identiﬁcation of possible, or already implemented, strategies
for mobilization or collective action to reorganize power relations [24] and to claim or create new
spaces as food system actors.
4.3. Sources of Information
4.3.1. Key Actors and Food System Activities
In a participatory food system mapping process [55], we identiﬁed the key actors in the two
different food systems who interact in the identiﬁed spaces of power. The agroindustrial food system
in Santa Cruz Department is characterized by the presence of TNCs, who are important actors in
input provision (seeds, agrochemicals, and machinery), as well as in processing and storage (silos,
transport, processing into edible oil, soy cake, and derivatives), and commercialization (organization
of export) [42,56]. Several TNCs are represented by the Association of Agricultural Input Providers
(APIA, also known as CropLife).
Farmers are locally classiﬁed into small-scale (<50 ha) and medium-scale (50–500 ha) farming
families, and large-scale enterprises (>500 ha) [56]. Agroindustrial farmers in Santa Cruz Department
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are organized in the Association of Wheat and Oilseed Producers (ANAPO) and receive institutional
support from the Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade (IBCE) and the Eastern Agribusiness Chamber
(CAO). Small-scale farming families are active in organizations of national political representation,
called the Uniﬁed Syndical Confederation of Rural Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB).
Women play a crucial role in food systems and participate at all stages, from being a part
of the workforce to ensuring family food security, while being disadvantaged in many aspects.
Small-scale women farmers are politically organized in the National Confederation of Peasant Women
“Bartolina Sisa,” a member of the international farmers’ grassroots organization La Vía Campesina.
This nationwide group is known as “Bartolinas” and negotiates for favorable conditions in access to
land, inputs, credits, and markets.
Several Bolivian civil society organizations (CSOs) have been working with the agroindustrial
sector as a way of trying to improve the situation of small-scale farming families. These CSOs
include Fides (which works on local food security and home gardens in San Julian); Probioma (which
provide eco-friendly alternatives to widely-used hazardous chemicals in soybean production) [49];
and Fundación Tierra (which conducts analyses of land distribution).
The State Enterprise to Support Food Production (EMAPA) buys rice, wheat, and maize from
small-scale and medium-scale farmers at favorable prices to balance low farm gate prices. Private silos
also purchase yield but mainly focus on soybean. On a scale not signiﬁcant for the soybean market,
processing companies such as Pil and Puravida include soy beverages in their food offerings for
national consumption. Their products are offered on the national market from their own distribution
channels, and mainly in supermarkets such as Hipermaxi, Ketal, and Fidalga.
Other relevant actors of the agroindustrial food system include small-scale farming families who
are not practicing agroindustrial farming but live in the area, local health experts from healthcare
centers, and the local ofﬁce of the Ministry of Work.
As a case study for the indigenous food system, we identiﬁed the food system of the Guaraní people
living in the Municipality of Cabezas, around 120 km south of Santa Cruz. The Guaraní people are
spread over Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, historically in search of the “land without evil”
(Ivy Marei), which, according to their collective memory, once brought them to the Bolivian Chaco [50].
The “Capitania Takovo Mora” where we conducted our research, is therefore a historical territory of
the Guaraní people that they inhabited long before Spanish colonization. European invaders used
part of the land for cattle, but the Chaco remained largely uncolonized until the late 19th century.
Jesuit missions in the 18th century, and Franciscans in the 19th, founded settlements (reductions) in
which they forced the Guaraní to live.
After independence in 1825, Guaraní communities achieved more autonomy, but mining and
large-scale agriculture combined with governmental military forces consolidated a system known as
empatronamiento. This meant that many Guaraní were forced to work under slave-like conditions for
mestizo families (patrones) on large haciendas in a debt–peonage system. Families usually received
food and clothes in return for their work, and temporarily a small piece of land to produce food.
The Bolivian state distributed lands to non-indigenous settlers, and Guaraní resistance against the
patrones and their allies rose until 1892 when they were defeated in the massacre of Kuruyuki (today
Monteagudo). The Chaco War (1932–1935) further opened the region for in-migration, and more
haciendas were established.
After the 1952 agrarian revolution and the agrarian reform in 1953, a state-organized colonization
of “empty lands” was further pursued. The achievements of the agrarian reform (land for small
farmers and citizenship for (highland) indigenous people) did not apply to Guaraní, who continued
under the empatronamiento system: Many civil servants who were in charge of redistributing the land
were large-scale landowners themselves or allies of these [57]. Furthermore, the patrones used the
land for crop production and/or kept animals, which was recognized as fulﬁlling the socio-economic
function of the land.
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4001 10 of 27
Upon the spread of industrial agriculture and cattle rearing as of the 1970s, there was widespread
mobilization among Guaraní communities in the Chaco region for land, freedom, and identity against
dominant “assimilationist” visions of development [58]. In 1987, the Guaraní People’s Assembly
(APG) was founded, supported by CSOs that included religious organizations. By the end of the 1980s,
Guaraní families without land initiated a process of settlement in what is today the municipality of
Cabezas. Bolivia recognized indigenous communal lands in 1996 after a strong rise of indigenous
movements across Latin America. Since then, the APG has initiated negotiations for the demand of the
Indigenous Communal Territory of Takovo Mora with National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA)
authorities in the Municipality of Cabezas.
Takovo Mora today has about 2400 Guaraní-speaking members in around 400 families.
They practice smallholder agriculture, hunting, ﬁshing, and handicraft. They also keep cows, pigs,
sheep, goats, chicken, and horses. Being a food system of local scale, much of the food produced
around households is processed and consumed by families. Women have an important role in these
processes of sustenance of life, because they are responsible for care activities including nutrition.
For example, they share and barter food (or local inputs for food production) in extended families
through self-organized collaboration systems [59]. However, the persistent drought in the area,
and the difﬁculties in producing hybrid maize for commercial purposes, pushes the Guaraní families
to search for income sources such as charcoal production or informal labor on neighboring farms
and in the surrounding cities. With the income generated as workers, families buy food from the
agroindustrial food system in community stores and in nearby markets. There are several organized
groups in Takovo Mora, e.g., women’s groups and CSOs supporting different topics, e.g., Probioma in
agroecological production, Pastoral Social Caritas (PASOC), or Plan International, which implements
nutrition programs. Other important actors in terms of research, publications, and events with and
about the Guaraní people include the Jesuit organization CIPCA and scientists such as Guaraní
philosopher and anthropologist Elias Claurey.
4.3.2. Qualitative Research Methods
This study was conducted within a larger research project [39]. We conducted 31 interviews
with different food system actors following the value chains we had identiﬁed as important for the
agroindustrial and the Guaraní food systems (see Section 2.1 and Table 1). The interviews covered
different food system aspects, and we derived the information on power indirectly, without asking
explicit questions on its dimensions. This was possible because in the interviews we used guiding
questions for the participants to answer in a narrative way. To study the Guaraní food system,
we decided to work with women’s groups because we quickly realized that they provided us with
many crucial insights into the food system. Complementary information on our research questions on
power came from observations and conversations during events and workshops, and from review of
the media and communication channels of the food system actors (websites, newsletters, publications,
presentations, etc.). A complementary study on the right to food and its enforcement at local food
system levels [60] provided additional insights on access to land and participation in decision-making
processes of different actors such as smallholder farmers in the soybean sector. Research took place
between January 2015 and April 2017. Field notes and recorded interviews were transcribed and
codiﬁed in ATLAS.ti (ATLAS.ti Scientiﬁc Software Development GmbH, Berlin, Germany, version Win
5.0). We codiﬁed the material according to the variables of the study (spaces, places, and forms of
power, related discourses, and strategies). For the interpretation of the qualitative results, we used
results from other studies and data from the broader research project.
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5. Results and Discussion
5.1. Spaces of Power
5.1.1. Agroindustrial Food System
In the agroindustrial food system, the stages of production, processing, distribution, and consumption
are highly separated spaces in spatial, social, and economic terms. For example, production of soybeans
and their consumption as cattle feed or meat can span more than half the globe.
“Soy goes to the international markets; almost all the soy from Santa Cruz leaves through the port
of Iquique, and from there it goes to other places. They do not take much care in the port with the
product, because they say it’s for animals.” (soy transport driver, Cabezas, 2016)
Socio-economic differentiation takes place within the value chain, for instance between small- and
large-scale farmers or between monthly incomes that farmers earn compared to input providers [61].
“There are years in which we work only to pay for our debts. Companies give us everything on credit,
they come to our house to offer [their products], but for us, it is not like for the big producers—they
have the advantage of buying wholesale; they buy it cheaper.” (small-scale soybean producer,
San Pedro, 2016)
At the production stage, production of soybean and other commodities takes place in spaces that
were claimed by the landowners, input providers, and purchasing companies, but tended to be closed
for other actors. For example, municipality of San Pedro staff reported being unable to enter large-scale
production areas:
“We cannot access the large-scale soybean farms in the municipality to verify whether environmental
laws are being respected. They do not allow us enter.” (Head of the environment and natural
resources management division, San Pedro Municipality [52])
We therefore classify the production space of the agroindustrial food system in our case study as
a closed space. The accessibility of soybean production for small producers is used as an argument for
the existence of private-sector technical advisors, who visit small producers on their land. Discursively,
they help to reduce risks in production and to adapt to climate change [62]. However, the advisory
system is connected to the dissemination of new technological packages (inputs such as seeds and
agrochemicals) for small producers, as the following statement indicates:
“ANAPO as an organization represents large, medium, and small producers. We are at the service of
more than 12,000 small-scale producers, so we are concerned that the varieties are more efﬁcient—we
always advise them.” (ANAPO technician, San Pedro, 2016)
A possible invited space is the Roundtable of Sustainable (later renamed “Responsible” [63])
Soybean (RTRS), which unites actors from industry and civil society (e.g., ANAPO, World Wildlife
Fund (WWF), and the Bolivian “Friends of Nature Foundation” (FAN)). Initiatives in Bolivia have been
taking place since at least since 2010. However, no Bolivian soy production area had yet been certiﬁed
at the time of research. Furthermore, assessments of the RTRS criticized its low non-binding standards
and insigniﬁcant environmental sustainability and social justice outcomes (see References [63–66]).
Food system activities of processing and storage were in our case study organized by two main
groups of actors: (1) TNCs, namely Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge, Cargill, and Dreyfus,
called “the ABCD” [67], which control about 80% of soybean trade worldwide [68], plus additional
actors such as silo companies or cooking oil producers; and (2) the state enterprise EMAPA which
also ran silos. While the ﬁrst group manage the space of processing and storage in a closed manner
(i.e., without participation of other actors in decision-making), the second actor, EMAPA, may be
classiﬁed as an invited space between state policy and local actors, which provides favorable terms of
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trade to small- and medium-scale farmers, providing an alternative structure within the logic of the
agroindustrial food system.
Regarding distribution and trade, nearly 90% of Bolivian soybean and its derivatives is exported [69].
As far as we were able to investigate regarding the export of soybeans, decisions are taken in
closed spaces. For example, prices for soybeans are set at the Chicago Board of Trade [68],
a closed space without much possibility of participation for soybean farmers. We did not primarily
focus on consumption because these activities took place mainly outside our study area. However,
there are cooking oil companies in Bolivia whose products are present in virtually every household
(e.g., “Rico” and “Fino” oil). Chicken feed is one important destination of soybeans within Bolivia.
Chicken consumption in Bolivia, usually as fried chicken, has risen from 10 kg per capita per annum
in 1993 to 42 kg in 2016 [70]. The space of consumption can be classiﬁed as closed, because we
were not able to identify possibilities for interaction on industrial food for concerned consumers.
A typical communication channel took the form of a private sector advertisement in public spaces,
e.g., “En Sofía se conﬁa” (“Sofía is trustworthy”) for a sausage company (see also Section 5.3 for
interaction with the Guaraní food system). However, we noted that spaces are being increasingly
claimed and created from the consumer side, for instance, through ongoing food movements in the
major cities (e.g., “Comida Conciente,” “conscious food” in La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz).
These movements aim explicitly at promoting and providing alternatives to ultra-processed, sugary,
fatty-acid rich foods originating in the agroindustrial food system.
Against this background, the consumption space of industrialized food may be regarded as being
in transition from a closed to a claimed space. Recycling was not a strong aspect in this food system:
issues of environmental pollution from waste and waste water were widely ignored and only broached
by few CSOs. The only recycling mechanism we identiﬁed in the agroindustrial food system was a
voluntary industry commitment to receive empty pesticide bottles in Santa Cruz (the “Campo Limpio”
programme by APIA/CropLife), which was planned and implemented in the closed space of the group
of afﬁliated TNCs (see Section 5.2).
5.1.2. Guaraní Food System
In contrast to the agroindustrial food system where spaces were more clearly separated, all food
system activities and stages of the Guaraní food system could be observed on the community land.
Even though not all processes involved took place there (e.g., when purchased food was consumed),
every activity within this food system, from production to consumption, was present locally. The spatial
extent is much smaller than in the agroindustrial food system, if we understand the communal
indigenous land of Takovo Mora as the food system space representative of the Guaraní food system.
Similarly, the social and economic extent were smaller than in the agroindustrial food system, but most
components were in the sphere of inﬂuence of the Guaraní communities, e.g., land, identity, knowledge,
practices, seeds, home gardens, and agricultural plots.
The “created” space that makes this possible is the communal land of the group. “Indigenous
Communal Territories” (TCOs) were legally recognized in 1996 as “inalienable, indivisible, irreversible
and collective [lands], composed of communities or groups of communities, exempt from seizure and
imprescriptible” ([58], pp. 82–83). However, the law recognizes private property claims within
TCO limits, as long as they fulﬁll the “socio-economic function,” which is usually interpreted as
a productive use of the land. Furthermore, subsoil is considered state property, rather than a part of
the communally-owned land (see Reference [58]). In turn, indigenous communities do not need to
demonstrate a socio-economic function of their community land, which can be understood as a legal
recognition of their ancestral territorial claim and extensive use of the land. Along with many other
indigenous communities, Guaraní groups of the Chaco region presented TCO proposals to the state.
In 1997, the TCO Takovo Mora was formally recognized as Guaraní territory. However, only 8514 ha
have been legally granted as a community property land title to the 11 Guaraní communities in ﬁve
discontinuous areas, which is 3.1% of the land area within the TCO boundaries that were recognized by
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INRA [71]. National media have reported that the communities of Takovo Mora have asked for 19 years
that their community land receive a title [72]. In 2006, the communal land title for the community of
Yateirenda (which was founded in 1999) was granted [73]. According to the Vice Ministry of Land,
92% from the TCO Takovo Mora area has been titled, or is in the process of being titled to other actors
(“tertiaries”). The TCOs were renamed “TIOCs” (Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos) in
the 2009 Constitution of Bolivia, and we shall hereafter refer to them thus. For comparison, in the
Guaraní TIOC Machareti further south, 30% of the land has a communal land title, while 70% has
been titled as private property to “tertiaries” [74]. There are also ﬁve registered large-scale private
properties of over 5000 ha in the Municipality of Cabezas within the limits of the TIOC. Some 44% of
the municipality’s inhabitants are from Mennonite communities, and only 11.75% of the municipality’s
inhabitants identify as Guaraní, making them a minority in the TIOC Takovo Mora [41]. Against this
background, it becomes clear that the local level of the agroindustrial food system surrounds the
indigenous food system.
5.2. Forms of Power
5.2.1. Agroindustrial Food System
Legislation is a form of visible power, which in the case of the agroindustrial food system in the
Department of Santa Cruz, is enforced by the National Service of Agricultural Health and Food Safety
(SENASAG) regarding, e.g., agricultural inputs. Worker’s rights are defended by the Ministry of
Work, which has an ofﬁce in the town of Montero near the Soybean areas of the Municipality of San
Pedro, and which supports employees’ claims regarding, e.g., delayed payments. In an interview,
the representative of the Ministry of Work stated:
“Here, the landowners ( . . . ) use short-term workers for 40–60 BOB (USD 5.7–8.5) per day. When
they have to pay, they often refuse to pay the correct wages, and in disregard of the law, they do not
pay for social security. Thus, the workers come to us, we argue, and they receive part of the amount in
question. Not everything, but part of it.”
INIAF is another state organization enforcing seed laws, with control posts along major roads.
The Bolivian Constitution, as well as several laws, prohibit or restrict genetically modiﬁed organisms
(GMOs). However, nearly 100% of the soybean area was cultivated with genetically modiﬁed
varieties [69], which was legalized in 2005 by Supreme Decree 28225. This was possible because
although the 2009 Constitution prohibits the import, production, and commercialization of GMOs,
the 2012 Framework Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Law No. 300, Art. 24/7) restricts this ban
to organisms where Bolivia is the “center of origin or of diversity”. TNCs that sell these inputs
and related organizations were present in mass media communications and organized various
public relations activities, among them a twice-weekly newsletter (“AgroAvances”). IBCE and
ANAPO regularly organized public events in the city of La Paz inviting ministries, universities,
and other public actors. Events had titles such as “Good news for genetically modiﬁed crops” [75].
Besides technological leadership and efﬁciency, we observed during the events a narrative of social
corporate responsibility combined with expressions of respect for the national legislation. Regarding
environmental responsibility, conservation agriculture referring to minimum tillage in soybean
cultivation was mentioned by ANAPO in different events. TNCs also presented themselves as
major actors in preventing harm from agriculture inputs and practices. For example, APIA/CropLife,
an organization of input-providing TNCs, organized a program of voluntary acceptance of empty
agrochemical bottles:
“The “Campo Limpio” programme is organized by APIA, in favour of afﬁliated enterprises, within
a policy of corporate social responsibility. The afﬁliated enterprises provide inputs to the country’s
agriculture, which they do in a responsible way, conducting a follow-up until the end of the life cycle of
the product, which means recycling the (agrochemical) bottles.” (APIA representative, Santa Cruz)
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The effects of hidden power were omnipresent during our research, for example regarding the
concentration of large amounts of land in few hands despite regulations to limit this. While the
Constitution only allows landholdings of up to 5000 ha, there were at least 23 registered private
properties over 5000 ha in the municipality of San Pedro, the largest one with 25,849 ha [41].
Furthermore, large-scale producers join up the land of their relatives or rent land from small and
medium producers. Ongoing concentration of land is exacerbated through the “al partir” arrangement
(where the harvest is shared between the landowners and the land users) as a mechanism of exclusion
of smallholders from agriculture, and of uniformization of land use [42].
Likewise, the modality of agricultural land rent is in the form of verbal agreements between small
producers and intermediaries connected to large-scale investors. Often, the land is formally in the
hands of communities, but it is used by other actors, as for instance in the “al partir” arrangement.
Informal agreements may be established with the intermediaries of private entrepreneurs, for the
rights to make productive investments on the community land. In some cases, the intermediaries
have managed to become part of the community. We observed another, similar, mechanism (also
described by Wesz Jr [67]): a form of outsourcing that consists of commitments between TNCs and
small producers, where the type of production is deﬁned in the exchange of credits and a guarantee to
buy the yield. In this agreement, the land functions as a guarantee, while successful production is the
responsibility of the small producer. Small producers perceived that this alternative opens up business
opportunities for them on their lands. The small producers are usually organized in communities,
which means that they comply with internal rules regarding water, health, education, and roads,
which the large-scale producers do not.
One issue of persistent tension has been whether “unproductive lands” should be reverted to the
state. Although the allocation of the Guaraní indigenous territory occurs within the framework of the
rights of indigenous peoples, critics have claimed that the indigenous people have not sufﬁciently
carried out the sustainable and productive management of the TIOCs. Using this argument, which was
also described by Svarstad [16], several legal mechanisms that grant free, prior, and informed
consent, or state that the TIOCs are inalienable, indivisible, exempt from seizure, and imprescriptible,
have recently been weakened or amended [59,71].
Another ﬁnding related to the hidden power of input-providing TNCs were highly unequal
incomes between large-scale farmers and smallholders: Large-scale farmers had proﬁt margins
approximately 250% higher per hectare of soybean, due to arrangements with TNCs relating to
inputs as well as to farm gate prices which were positively related to soybean quantities sold. Input
providers (vendors of seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers) earned on average 220% more than the other
food system actors [61].
Enforcement of laws relating to the environment and to agricultural inputs was found to be
lacking in Santa Cruz Department [60]. One example was that the environmental unit of the Municipal
Government was not able to access large-scale soybean farms to check whether environmental laws
were being respected (see Section 5.1). The presence of banned and restricted pesticides in shops and
on farms was another sign of hidden power superposing on visible power. For instance, we found
several products containing methamidophos, an insecticide that is listed on the Rotterdam Convention
(which Bolivia has signed), and which has been banned in Bolivia since 2015. Another indication was
that in 2017, at least 30,000 ha cultivated with genetically modiﬁed maize were identiﬁed in the Chaco
region [76,77], despite being banned by the Constitution and several laws. At the time of research,
there was, to our knowledge, no independent, ofﬁcial research at the national level on the effects of
the application of agroindustrial production on environmental impacts and on the Bolivian food and
agricultural system. Most available information came from TNCs or related organizations. As an
example, a representative of APIA described the situation as follows:
“When we want to commercialize a product, we transfer knowledge on its application, in presentations,
with print materials, and with audiovisual materials; at the same time, we reach out to farmers in
Sustainability 2018, 10, 4001 16 of 27
“ﬁeld days” which we organize in the Municipalities, where we present the new products and their
use.” (APIA representative, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 2016)
A drought in 2016 built the basis for a discursive argument around the permission to import
genetically modiﬁed corn for the secured supply of feed chicken farms, considering that chicken is
the most consumed meat nationwide. For a short period of time, the import of a certain amount of
genetically modiﬁed corn from Argentina was thus permitted. However, activists claimed that the
import of corn in grain form had the intention of inserting GMOs not authorized by national legislation,
and that the climate crisis became the justiﬁcation to create an alliance of the private sector with a part
of the State:
“We have investigated, and neither INIAF nor customs said anything about corn grain trucks. This
is not allowed, because they should have imported broken corn. This corn was for seed. There are now
more or less 60,000 hectares of transgenic corn growing in the Chaco of Santa Cruz.” (anonymous
activist, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 2017)
We identified the effects of invisible power within the agroindustrial food system when we interviewed
two representatives of the national peasant women farmers’ organization “Bartolinas,” an official member
organization of the international agroecological farmers’ movement La Via Campesina. However, one of
the main activities of the Departmental group of Santa Cruz was to demand land from the national
government for its members, together with agroindustrial inputs to cultivate soybeans:
“We are 6367 members in the department, all small-scale producers. Only 30% of the women have a
land title document with their name on it. We demand land for groups of us. The largest [available]
lands are in the Chaco region. There we can spray pesticides on those crops that we sell, while avoiding
spraying close to our homes and on the crops that we eat ( . . . ) we want to have a closer link to
La Vía Campesina, we want to aspire to their vision, but we are still far away.” (Departmental
representative, Bartolinas, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 2016)
Such internalized concepts or perceptions of not being able to change the prevailing mode of
operation were also observed in consumption: In a previous study, we found a pronounced perception
among consumers regarding pesticide residues and unhealthy food, but at the same time, a low level of
related actions to change the situation. Interviewees explained that consciousness was strong, but that
they did not see enough room for action [52].
5.2.2. Guaraní Food System
We identiﬁed several strong formal and informal norms and structures of visible power in the
Guaraní food system. First, and maybe most importantly, through the legal communal land title,
visible power over the land is allocated to the community. Second, the collective land requires
a communal, territorial governance structure for the use and management of natural resources.
The speciﬁc form of governance in the Guaraní communities was therefore another mechanism
of visible power. Recognized by the Constitution, this parallel system of administration of territories
and justice may be described as parastatal.
The Guaraní communities we researched had a collective ownership structure within their TIOC
deﬁning access to, protection of, and responsibilities regarding communal resources. This applied,
e.g., to food production (including usufruct rights for land use for individual families), and to
reciprocity mechanisms (e.g., community work, known as faena or motirõ), which required a formal
invitation and the provision of food and the maize drink chicha, and could not be declined [50].
Sharing food was described as a usual mechanism in the Guaraní communities of Takovo Mora (ibid.).
Guaraní groups in the Bolivian Chaco live in relatively small communities with 50–1500 inhabitants.
Every Guaraní community elected their Mburuvicha (an, often elderly, person elected by the community,
also known as “captain”). Several communities together formed a “captaincy,” as in the case of Takovo
Mora. The leaders of those captaincies represent the Guaraní communities in the APG. The communities
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are legally equipped with three visible powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative power
consists of the communal assembly for the definition of internal norms. The executive refers to the
directive of representation, named “captaincies”. Finally, the judicial power evaluates situations of
violation of rights, a factor that generated permanent conflicts between the families, and that at the
same time constituted an opportunity for the territorial governance:
“The assembly is our highest instance, there we solve our problems, as a captain I have to see if the
statutes are complied with, but sometimes they [the families] do not want to give in, and they quickly
hold me responsible.” (Capitan Grande, Yateirenda, 2016)
Decisions are made in extended families, and the representatives in power were selected among
them, taking into account which families had been represented in previous turns. In the Directoral
Guaraní People’s Assembly, the communal captain or Mburuvicha is the highest authority with the
mandate of safeguarding harmony and justice within the community. The assembly, in this case the
Mburuvichas of the 11 communities of Takovo Mora, met regularly. The assembly started with the
words “Those who do not discuss, do not live well” [50]. During often more than a day, problems were
debated until a consensus or compromise was reached, and at the end, all Mburuvichas signed the
documentation of the gathering. The right to the parastatal governance structures of indigenous
peoples in Bolivia is granted through the supranational structure of the 2007 Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, ILO convention 169, and national legislation that recognizes and protects
indigenous governance systems and deﬁnes the coordination of indigenous and state constitutional
legislation. According to Article 15/2 of ILO Convention 169, the signatory governments have to
consult indigenous peoples before the realization of mining, oil, or other concessions (free, prior,
and informed consent). This visible legislative power is challenged by conﬂicting interests when
it comes to the rich natural resources, particularly oil and gas reserves, of the Chaco region [78].
Indeed, during our research in Takovo Mora, a violent conﬂict over an oil and gas concession within
the TIOC erupted. The villagers from Yateirenda blocked the interdepartmental road that passes the
village after an unsatisfying dialogue process with the Ministry of Hydrocarbons. After two days
and nights of road blockage, hundreds of armed soldiers attacked the village and destroyed several
homes, arresting and harassing many villagers, including the elderly and children. Children ﬂed to
the forest where some of them got lost and were only found after several days. The event represents a
sad collective memory in the history of Takovo Mora [50].
Hidden power: According to the 2005 Hydrocarbon Law, oil companies have to pay 18% of their
income as royalties to Departments, in addition to the 32% they pay the state. This contribution is
then distributed to the communities including the TIOCs. Since the TIOCs allow for private land titles,
and the resources below the surface are not part of the TIOCs, negotiations are often ﬁerce. In the
case of Takovo Mora, the TIOC built the legal grounds for negotiation for the Guaraní community.
The building of the captaincy of Takovo Mora was ﬁnanced by the national oil company YPFB [50].
However, several villagers commented during our research that royalties had disappeared in the
communities. Even though we were not in a position to verify these claims, we noted an inﬂuence
of the discourses of mainly young men in the village about projects to buy improved cattle breeds,
to which the payments were ofﬁcially channelled. A possible explanation is that due to territorial
overlap (the Guaraní communities only hold legal land titles for parts of the TIOC; other parts are in
private hands), the captaincies are pushed to permanently negotiate with the State to obtain royalties
from oil exploitation. The presence of royalties provides the possibility of executing projects for the
Guaraní families, because the funds come with the objective of improving the local economy. However,
it is common for negotiations to be carried out only with the larger captaincies of the territories, and the
broader public is rarely informed or involved in decision-making about the destination of the funds,
the amounts, and the beneﬁciaries [59].
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“One does not know what they are doing there in Mora, sometimes we get support, but it does not
provide for all families, it would be better if they spread the money by community and here we see
what we do with it.” (anonymous priest, Yateirenda, 2016)
Another way to build hidden power within the community was through family support networks.
Women organized community networks with family support, based on the exchange of inputs and
services. Practices such as community work for tasks of collective interest, the organization of festivities,
baptisms, or burials have an important component of bartering food, in exchange for work or social
support. This is a source of power as these practices constitute spaces for building alliances and making
decisions prior to the communal assemblies. In terms of communal political organization, women show
an active presence, although they are not strongly visible in the assemblies and supra-communal
interaction spaces [59]. Family properties and family possessions in the communities were usually
inscribed in the name of men. We identiﬁed only ﬁve cases in Yateirenda where women had land titles
in their names; all were widowed or separated, which points to a disempowerment of women with
regard to the right to food. Furthermore, we noted internal divisions in Takovo Mora. Power relations
divided communities according to political parties (pro-government and opposition), religion (Catholic
vs Protestant), and gender (women groups, and the men-dominated assembly) [59]. This weakening
of the community was exacerbated by a seeming disempowerment regarding production. This was
shown through a loss of native maize varieties and seeds (due to more difﬁcult cultivation conditions,
the Guaraní could no longer store certain seeds and instead had to purchase them from seed stores),
and a change in diets towards less diversiﬁed food such as fried chicken and rice [53]. Access to land
depended on internal rules as deﬁned in the Guaraní People’s Assembly in the Takovo Mora Captaincy.
The Guaraní territory was distributed according to a system of territorial regulation, which comprised
a housing area, a family or communal agricultural production area, a small forest reserve, and a
communal livestock farming area. From the perspective of Guaraní women, the right of access to land
is subject to agreements between groups of families with greater power. There are differences between
old and new members, and between women and men. Women have access to small productive areas
around their homes. In fact, access to agricultural land depends on marital status: unmarried women
work in the areas assigned to their relatives.
“They gave us a piece of land when I got together with my husband, he produces corn, and although he
does not dedicate much time to production anymore, he helps, together with my eldest son. My sister
is not married and lives with my father, that's why she does not have land.” (community member,
Yateirenda 2016)
A mechanism to receive land within the TIOC for non-Guaraní is marriage with a Guaraní
woman. The respective person must not possess other lands and must marry a Guaraní woman
from the community. Other studies found that various Quechua men came to Takovo Mora and to
Yateirenda with the aim of marrying a Guaraní woman [50].
Due to a dry period that spanned several years prior to our research, a portion of productive
TIOC land was not cultivated by the community. Some families, who reportedly had power within
the community, rented the temporarily uncultivated lands to private landowners, under informal
agreements that were rarely in accordance with the communal assemblies. In addition, there were
cases within the Guaraní territory where the rights to productive investments on community land were
sold to buyers who were gradually included as members of the community. Community members who
sell rights to productive investments are known as white sticks and reportedly worked for large-scale
investors, whose names cannot appear on a communal TIOC land title.
Invisible power: During our research, we noted a certain level of inactivity of the villagers regarding
their food system, especially in consumption: First, villagers reported that food traditions were rarely
practiced. Also, Mendoza [53] identiﬁed a loss of knowledge related to food traditions and identity.
This author describes an internalization of a non-traditional, uniform diet, as the common daily diet
had changed to fried chicken with white rice. A food festival that we co-organized within the research
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project where around 25 different traditional dishes were presented showed that knowledge was still
available, but the ingredients had to be bought in Santa Cruz as they were no longer produced by the
villagers. Comments on the shift in diets were mostly to the tune of “that is how it is”. There seemed to
be a similar attitude towards the illegal renting out of community land, as well as the apparently very
unequal distribution of royalties. Representatives from CSOs who worked with Guaraní communities
interpreted this attitude to accept suffering and marginalization as historically cemented in the form of
an internalization of dependence. Llanque [59] describes how, in the local territorial context, a source
of power that is invisible but fundamental for the continuity of the food system is managed by some
of the Guaraní women within their habits of food production and processing. The Guaraní women
described their agricultural practices as their main activity together with the work in their homes.
Home gardens in Yateirenda produced an average of 13 different types of food and had a high symbolic
value for the women: they mentioned that there were always times when they were unable to buy
food. The majority of the women did not have other sources of additional income, but they reported
that for those Guaraní women who lived closer to urban centres, the reproduction of life depended on
the combination of income-generating practices and taking care of the family, including the production
of food for their own consumption. In this sense, invisible power in the form of a diversiﬁcation logic
included the Guaraní women in a market economy, as an intermediate system that is dependent on,
and at the same time moves away from, the dependence on the massive production of monocultures.
5.3. Places of Power
5.3.1. Agroindustrial Food System
The agroindustrial food system was not only globally vertically integrated, but also inﬂuenced
remotely in terms of prices, demand, and technology, which was in marked contrast to the Guaraní
food system. For instance, production, though taking place at the local level of the Municipality of
San Pedro, was part of a regional “Soybean Cluster,” which in 2016 covered 585,047.3 km2 of Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, and produced 16,967,141 t or 50.7% of the world’s soybean
yield [79].
Oliveira and Hecht [63] described how local land use change related to soybean production in
South America was driven by regional and global commodity markets. These authors describe a
“sowing pools phenomenon,” which refers to TNCs who pool their capital from a range of investors
from the local to the global level and thus draw from transnational ﬂows of capital and knowledge
(corresponding to the subsystem of information and services presented in Section 2.2.), to expand
throughout the continent, leading to a pattern of few TNCs operating hundreds of thousands of farms
(operational food system). The resulting “soy republic” (so described in a Syngenta advertisement [80])
has its own governance system, transcending individual countries’ borders and political frameworks
(Figure 5). Oliveira and Hecht [63] argue that the territorial expansion over countries represents the
source of power over individual farmers.
Processing and distribution, as well as commercialization of soybeans in Bolivia, was concentrated
(to over 90%) in the hands of six companies, ranging from national (e.g., Granos) to transnational
(e.g., Cargill) [42]. Wesz Jr [67] analyzed strategies and dynamics of TNCs in different spaces and
concluded that their power as displayed at a global scale has its roots in local relationships with
farmers and landowners, based on proximity, trust, reciprocity, and family friendship linkages [63].
Indeed, the national representative of Bayer who we interviewed was from Brazil, and the national
representative of Syngenta was from Argentina, which likely played a role in connecting to the soybean
producers, many of whom, especially among those farmers with more capital, are from Brazil and
Argentina (see also Reference [43]).
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Figure 5. Soybean production in South America in 2013. Source: Reference [63], with permission from
the authors.
5.3.2. Guaraní Food System
Although most food system activities took place on the local level within the TIOC, the Guaraní
communities were supranationally linked through the backing of ILO Convention 169 and the 2007
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The territorial organization also corresponded to a
supraterritorial structure (the regional captaincies); in the case study this was the Captaincy of Takovo
Mora, which in turn was structured within the APG. The APG was part of the continental movement of
the Guaraní people, an active entity that gathered continuously to analyze their issues in a geopolitical
context. One Guaraní community member, a former Mburuvicha, explained that the APG members
held contact and frequently travelled to Paraguay or Brazil to meet with the APG members there.
5.4. Strategies for Negotiation and Action
As the analysis of spaces of power showed, spaces in which key actors interacted were mainly
closed or invited, but seldom created. The production and local level of the industrial food system
surrounded the Guaraní food system with mainly closed spaces, with the local level of the Guaraní
system representing, at least in part, all food system spaces from production to consumption in a
created space (the community land). This created space was manifested through a land title which we
interpreted as a form of visible power. Visible power was also important in the agroindustrial food
system, in the form of interrelations of the rule of law and corporate concentration. Locating the two
food systems on the power cube, we see the industrial food system acting in closed spaces which were
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in some, very speciﬁc cases, moving towards claimed spaces. The food system actors and activities
were present in global, national, and local places, and were related to visible, hidden, and invisible
forms of power. The Guaraní food system operated in a claimed space, with some supranational links,
also making use of, and inﬂuenced by, visible, hidden, and invisible power.
Hidden power was the most present form of power in both case studies. The analysis provided
indications on how hidden power undermined legal visible power, e.g., regarding the maximum
permissible land size and the actual landholding size in both municipalities of San Pedro and Cabezas,
or pesticides and genetically modiﬁed crops that are restricted by law but nevertheless in use.
Power cube analysis is also intended to help understand the possibilities for (or also limitations
and even dangers of) changes in spaces, forms, and levels of power [24]. In the agroindustrial
food system, negotiation possibilities for the most marginalized actors, i.e., the small-scale farmers,
seemed limited to the “al partir” arrangement. Regarding the food system space of consumption,
intransparency shifted the decision-making power from consumers to retailers.
In the case of resource exploitation and conﬂict in Takovo Mora, negotiations are difﬁcult despite
the existence of a comprehensive visible power: Schilling-Vacaﬂor [71] describes how results of prior
consultations about extractive projects have not been taken into account by decision-makers, also in
Takovo Mora. Our interviews conﬁrmed this, but they also suggest that the TIOC provided possibilities
to negotiate. Pointing to the attractiveness of negotiating with the oil companies, a founding member
of the APG stated:
“The topic of the oil companies to me seems crucial to understand the negotiation forms of the
guaranties with municipal institutions. While the negotiations with the oil company are direct and the
petitions are responded to relatively quickly, the processes to negotiate a budget with the municipality
and the departmental government are too long and complicated, and therefore, the brothers sometimes
say: the best would be if they found oil here.” (APG member, 2016)
Another example in the case of Yateirenda is the sausage enterprise Sofía, which used a road
passing through Yateirenda community land to their production site. For this, they delivered 540 eggs
to the community weekly, and constructed a small health post which they provided with medicines [50].
The presence of private land titles between disconnected TIOC parts and within claimed indigenous
land has been interpreted as an entry point for extraction activities [58,78]. As the conﬂict in
Yateirenda in 2015 showed, after not being heard by the central government and the state oil company,
the Mburuvichas decided to block a major road. This strategic use of a power resource may also be
interpreted as a resort to claim and negotiate about their share [59]. After the conﬂict, the families of
Yateirenda received chicken and cows as compensation from the national government [50]. A former
village authority indicated the captaincy’s negotiating power by stating:
“As APG, we are strong regarding hydrocarbons. When we stand up, they have to negotiate with us.”
(former female Mburuvicha, Yateirenda 2015)
Another important strategy we observed was the interest and initiative of some of the women in
the community to produce their own food. The participatory observation and related activities with
them showed us that they did not need much to proactively improve their production and diet: In the
framework of a small home-garden project, we observed that they quickly diversiﬁed their existing
production and started to produce a variety of vegetables with some fencing and seeds provided by
the research project. One woman said: “Now we are eating our own produce, like before, when we had
natural food” (community member of Yateirenda, 2016).
The experience of food production in the Guaraní communities can be regarded as a potential
form of “food resistance”. Only maize had the double purpose of consumption and sale; all other crops
produced around the homes (e.g., squash, beans, groundnut, watermelon, sweet potato, and cassava)
were for the families’ own consumption. Llanque [59] interpreted the home gardens as having a double
purpose, to sustain both life and culture. The author describes how, for instance, the families’ own
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sweet potato increasingly replaced the usually consumed rice bought from the agroindustrial food
system on the plates of the Guaraní families. According to Larimore and Schmutz [81], building a
new sense of community and place may shift the focus from simply “eating local” to experiencing
place as a critical ingredient to food systems that are more socially and environmentally just, as well
as equitable and sustainable. This experience may also apply to restoring a food identity related to
sustainable production and consumption. For this purpose, it is not enough to create spaces: a shift
in forms of power is also needed, e.g., as in the example of the legal basis regarding indigenous land
rights. Nelson et al. [13] concluded from their power cube analysis in Kenya, that although there is
increased public participation in governance, the creation of invited or claimed spaces is not enough to
shift power relations or even to challenge the status quo.
In the case of the Guaraní food system, we could see that the situation of the communities in a
natural-resource rich context is conﬂictive and difﬁcult. However, we also observed that there is room
for negotiation with actors claiming access to land and resources within Guaraní territory, due to visible
power and a claimed space in the Guaraní food system. The negotiations may result in comparatively
small beneﬁts for the communities due to a range of limiting factors and may not change the power
imbalance between the Guaraní and the surrounding agroindustrial food system. The discourses of
TNC-related actors of the agroindustrial food system on efﬁciency and corporate responsibility have
been interpreted as a legitimization of agroindustrial activities in Santa Cruz Department and of the
search for solutions within the agroindustrial logic [59].
Regarding the relationship of hidden power and legal visible power, social corporate responsibility
approaches deserve more analytical attention with regard to their sustainability and justice outcomes,
as compared to rights-based approaches. Loconto and Fouilleux [64] analyzed the International Social
and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance (ISEAL), a voluntary sustainability standards
organization at the global level, and found that a lack of binding commitments (e.g., on what
“sustainability” is or should be) has made some members, especially those with a high credibility in
the sector, leave the organization. Clapp et al. [82] complement this view by concluding that voluntary
sustainability projects by actors who are not responsive to democratic control may promote their own
particular understanding of development. This understanding may not necessarily be in line with the
concerns of local actors or more generally, countries in the global South, e.g., in terms of land reform,
subsidy policy reform, or anti-dumping policies. Against this background and based on our ﬁndings,
we argue that a rights-based approach is more likely than a voluntary social responsibility approach to
address the root causes of environmental degradation, poverty, and inequality, and to make progress
on the fair and sustainable production, distribution, and consumption of food.
6. Conclusions
The analysis of power in two food systems in Bolivia helped to identify visible (but not always
ofﬁcial) forms of power, and how this visible power is inﬂuenced by the two other forms of power.
Spaces of power in the two food systems tended to be closed (or, in some examples, invited) in
the agroindustrial food system, and historically created in the Guaraní food system. Forms ranged
from visible to hidden and invisible in both food systems, with a strong tendency of hidden power
undermining legal, visible power as a linking element between the food systems.
Discourses of corporate social responsibility and sustainability prevailed, determining the few
activities related to environmental sustainability in the agroindustrial food system. Actors of this food
system maintain a discourse of sustainable intensiﬁcation, of conservation agriculture, of tackling food
scarcity with modern and efﬁcient production methods, and of the adaptability of genetically modiﬁed
crops to future climate change scenarios. At the same time, deforestation and pesticide use linked to
industrial agriculture in Bolivia keep rising.
Places of power connecting the supranational to the local level proved crucial to corporate
strategies on the one hand, and to increased negotiation possibilities in the Guaraní food system on
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the other. However, in terms of global integration, the magnitude of area and impact of the indigenous
food system was not comparable to that of the agroindustrial food system.
Combined with the mostly closed spaces where decisions were taken, the soybean-based
agroindustrial food system in the municipality of San Pedro may be regarded as part of a
non-democratic global agroindustrial complex spanning the stages of production to consumption.
In sum, the historical power relations of the indigenous food system, and those of the agroindustrial
food systems that have expanded in the last decades, have very different characteristics.
The composition of these characteristics implies a power disequilibrium, transitioning into a form of
“power over” [31]: The now predominant agroindustrial food system has been assimilating indigenous
and other food systems in the various stages. As we observed, this took place at the production
stage, in the value chains, and in the consumption of industrialized–simpliﬁed instead of traditional
diversiﬁed food.
In spite of this predominance and assimilation process, there are local strategies to resist these
power imbalances, for instance by consuming own food, produced by Guaraní women around their
homes. This food source can be regarded as a response to the crisis caused by insufﬁcient access
to adequate food. It is also an expression of the interrelationship of the dominant agri-productive
structure and the agency at the local level that generates alternatives, in a food system occurring at a
territorial level.
A comparatively favorable legal framework for the indigenous community land provided a
considerable space of visible power to the Guaraní communities in our study area. In this respect,
the situation in Bolivia may be regarded as special, but visible and hidden power of national resource
interests, agroindustrial investors, and other actors put indigenous food systems under pressure.
Against this background, and taking the created space using visible power of the Guaraní food
system as an example, democratization processes need to be enhanced. Such processes should shift
power from hidden to legitimized visible forms, and from closed to more claimed and created spaces,
and hence allow for, and require, more participation of historically and currently disadvantaged actors.
Governing claimed and created food system spaces requires a careful analysis of the discourses that
take place during the participatory processes, to make visible demands for a better realization of the
right to food as opposed to functional demands within the dominant structures.
The power cube as a tool proved useful for shedding light on different dimensions of power
that are interdependent, but not one and the same. This differentiation helps to identify weaknesses
(in our case for instance the strong presence of hidden power in both food systems) and points to
opportunities for improvement. The power cube does not, however, necessarily identify positive
or negative expressions of power, e.g., “power over,” “power to,” “power with,” or “power within”
([83] cited in [84]). The testimony of the Guaraní points to another dimension which may need to
be addressed in addition to the power cube dimensions: the relationships of claimed spaces and
visible power to institutions, i.e., the “rules of the game” [85], that allow for or impede local agency.
Therefore, we recommend linking tools such as the power cube, for the analysis of different power
dimensions, with institutional analysis [86,87], for a better understanding of why and how hidden
power undermines legitimized visible power. One approach could be actor network analysis and
“institution shopping” [88], and how these compositions allow for one food system to absorb another.
For these approaches to advance, it will be important to focus explicitly on human actors as a starting
point of the analysis, to include more marginalized groups and to link actors and their institutions to
land use change in the sense of a political ecology approach.
In the face of increasing globally-governed inﬂuences on food systems and their natural resource
base through commodity markets, it will be crucial to undertake critical analyses of sustainable
development topics and food system transformation using political ecology frameworks as a theoretical
background. Our interpretation of the power cube analysis framework to food systems, taking two
examples from Bolivia, is meant as a contribution to reinserting power relations into sustainable
development research on food systems.
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